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WHEN IDENTITY BOUNDARIES ARE BREACHED: 
EXAMINING THE SCANDAL OF THE 1998 WINTER OLYMPICS 
ABSTRACT 
We analyze media portrayals of the identity of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
regarding the 1998 Salt Lake City bribery scandal. Analyzing press accounts, supplemented by 
archival documents and interviews, we found that prior to the scandal, the IOC partitioned its 
hybrid identity elements, buffering ideology of Olympism from the economics of the Olympic 
Games. The scandal ruptured the identity boundary, mixing ideology and economics in the wake 
of the scandal, confounding and tainting organizational identity. With the scandal juxtaposing 
identity elements, calls for IOC reform advocated identity reconstruction that would again 
partition identity elements. Our findings attest to the critical role of boundary management in 
identity construction within a hybrid organization. 
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In 1998, a bribery scandal visibly rocked the image of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), the “supreme authority of the Olympic Movement” (IOC, 1992: 17). With its 
stated goal of “building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practiced 
without discrimination of any kind,” the IOC is the institutional carrier of the ideology of 
Olympism. In addition, the IOC is also responsible for staging the Olympic Games, which are 
themselves among “the most visible rituals dramatizing the world polity” (Boli & Thomas, 1997: 
183), and, over the last two decades, have become increasingly lucrative ventures for both the 
cities and corporations that sponsor them. It is in the Olympic Games that IOC joins these two 
potentially conflictual elements of its hybrid identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985), wedding the 
symbolic to the instrumental through “the business of manufacturing heroes and retaining 
dreams” (The Wall Street Journal, 1/6/99).  The scandal cleaved this conjoined identity. Charges 
of corruption were leveled against members of the Salt Lake City committee and the IOC over 
the bidding process for the 2002 Winter Games: 
… a scandal arose in which organizers were accused of bribing members of the I.O.C. to 
swing their votes Salt Lake city’s way through $1 million in offers of cash, scholarships 
for members’ children, jobs and other favors. 
A series of investigations followed, including one by the state that found ethical 
standards, but not criminal statutes, were breached. That seemed to send the scandal 
away. But the Justice Department stepped in, charging two senior officials involved in 
Salt Lake City’s bid, Thomas K. Welch and David R. Johnson, with 15 felony counts of 
bribery, fraud and conspiracy. Ten members of the I.O.C. caught up in the scandal either 
resigned or were expelled (Janofsky, 2/9/02: 1). 
The scandal juxtaposed the lofty ideology and the fraudulent business practice, creating a 
nearly irreconcilable image of seemingly corrupt Olympism. The revelation of untoward 
behavior cast a pall on IOC’s credibility, an organization whose charter is founded on “respect 
for universal fundamental ethical principles” (IOC, 1992: 9). As much as the bribery charges 
tainted the ideological luster, the valorized ideology became a burden for the management of the 
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business of the Olympics. The shady business practices were particularly damaging to the IOC 
image because of its principles of ethics, “fair play,” and excellence that were seemingly violated 
or abused. 
Focusing on the event of the scandal, we examine the IOC’s identity and, in particular, its 
compartmentalization of two potentially conflicting elements: the normative ideology of 
Olympism and utilitarian economics of producing the Olympic Games. Through analyses of IOC 
documents, interviews with IOC consultants, and media accounts of the scandal, we examine the 
how the identity boundary separating the normative-utilitarian distinctions elements ruptured and 
impacted the perceived legitimacy of the IOC. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of repair 
strategies for identity restoration in hybridized organizations confronting crises. 
Our inquiry links the identity literature to the institutional literature through an explicit 
consideration of how boundaries function to segment and buffer dualistic elements of an 
organization’s identity, and how boundary failures threaten the legitimacy of a claimed identity. 
By examining identity threats that are organizationally agentic, we complement extant work on 
threats proffered by external third parties (e.g., Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). And, in contrast to 
work that takes the perspective of organizational members (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; 
Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), we focus on organizational outsiders, or public audience, who can 
give or withhold endorsement and thus legitimation (Suchman, 1995). And finally, building on 
empirical studies that have examined identity dynamics within organizations (e.g., Glynn, 2000; 
Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997), we illuminate how hybrid organizations manage the tension 
between identity elements. We begin with a review of the literatures that focus on identity and 
legitimacy. We follow this with an analysis of the specialized identity of the IOC and then 
examine media portrayals of the tarnished IOC identity and, ultimately, its repair. We conclude 
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with implications for theorizing organizational identity and the management of organizational 
identities under disrepair. 
IDENTITY BOUNDARIES AND SEGREGATED LOGICS 
The answer to the central question of identity—“Who are we?”—for many, if not most, 
organizations (Albert & Whetten, 1985) is one of multiplicity, as organizations often contain 
different conceptualizations of “who are we” as a collective (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Although 
theoretical and empirical inquiries have demonstrated how hybrid identities function to affect 
individual and organizational outcomes (e.g., Albert & Whetten, 1985; Glynn, 2000; Golden-
Biddle & Rao, 1997; Pratt & Foreman, 2000), little is known about how hybrid identities are 
patterned intra-organizationally or to what effect. Given that the demarcation of identity 
boundaries is fundamental to hybridization, we address this issue by focusing on the patterns of 
connectedness and demarcation between identity elements within an organization. 
From the sociological literature, we take note of how boundaries are essential in the 
construction and legitimation of organizational identity. Boundaries are endemic to classification 
systems; “in part because it captures a fundamental social process, that of relationality” (Lamont 
& Molnar, 2002: 169). Boundaries define, sort, and classify so as to render things 
comprehensible and thus legitimate (Douglas, 1986; Suchman, 1995). For instance, Lamont 
(1992) documents how socioeconomic distinctions are predicated upon symbolic boundaries, i.e., 
“conceptual distinctions made to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space 
… whose efficacy lies in shared taken-for-granted definitions of reality” (Lamont & Molnar, 
2002: 168).  Relatedly, Quadagno and  Fobes (1995) show how symbolic and structural 
boundaries function in gender identification and distinction among US Job Corps members. 
DiMaggio's prolific work (DiMaggio, 1982) on arts institutions speaks to how status categories 
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distinguish and demarcate elites. Boundaries delineate the contours of a collective identity (e.g., 
Gamson, 1992; Melucci, 1996) and the rules of engagement Extending this work, we theorize 
that boundaries should play a similar role within an organization,  partitioning the multiplicity of 
hybrid  organizational identities. 
The notion of multiple organizational identities was first given voice by Albert and 
Whetten (1985: 270). In their influential work, they defined hybrid organizational identities as 
those that contain elements that are potentially conflictual. This patterning of identity elements 
can be holographic, with each organizational unit reflecting the plurality of identity elements 
(Albert & Whetten, 1985). Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997), in their study of a non-profit 
organization, demonstrate that such identity conflict is resolved within holographic organizations 
by individual members as they seek to resolve inherent tensions between claimed—and 
conflictual—identity elements. Boundaries in holographic organizations, then, can be perceived 
and managed by individuals. 
Alternatively, the patterning of different identities may be specialized or ideographic in 
that “each internal [organizational] unit exhibits only one identity” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 
271). Essentially, this is a strategy of compartmentalization, whereby “the organization and its 
members choose to preserve all current identities but do not seek to attain any synergy among 
them” (Pratt & Foreman, 2000: 26). Glynn (2000) demonstrated how a musicians' strike at an 
orchestra revealed a latent contest over the identity of the organization. She found that claims of 
the orchestra’s identity were championed by different groups in ways that were consistent with 
the legitimating values of their profession: musicians enacted artistic norms while administrators 
espoused fiscal guardianship. In the ideographic organization, boundaries drawn between 
identity elements can contest “not simply…alternative budget proposals, but…the very soul of 
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the institution” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 272). In other words, incomplete integration between 
identity elements marks ideographic organizations. Undergirding normative-utilitarian hybrids 
are “two logical systems of management:” “In a normative organization, the principle for 
determining what ought to be retained is tradition. In a utilitarian organization, the principle is 
cost-effectiveness” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 287).  Moreover, the “loosely coupled (Weick, 
1976) ideographic structure … [acts] … as a set of boundaries, keeping apart what might be 
conflicting points of view, philosophies of education, rules of procedure, and priorities” (Albert 
& Whetten, 1985: 286). In the parlance of institutional theorists, such identity elements are 
bounded by different systems of meaning, cultural values, and institutional logics, all of which 
lend meaning and thus legitimacy to the collective (Suchman, 1995), but function to separate 
different aspects from contaminating the other. 
Logics are predicated upon a set of beliefs about what is appropriate. Haveman and Rao 
(1997: 1606) point out that organizations are one of  the most important carriers of institutions, 
which are  a bundle “of norms, beliefs, values, rules and taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
way the world works.” And, while a single institutional logic may characterize a non-hybridized 
organizational identity, multiple logics, by definition, characterize a hybridized organizational 
identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985). When identity boundaries rupture, confusion about the 
identity and its logical basis ensues. As a result, audiences may feel frustrated as the “rules of the 
game” no longer apply; understandability and, in turn, legitimacy is problematized. Albert and 
Whetten (1985: 279) illustrate such a failure of boundary demarcation: 
Faced with retrenchment, a church, for example, may hire financial experts who may 
become so important that the financial criteria they espouse, such as cost effectiveness, 
may come to directly challenge other principles of decision making and the identity of the 
organization in the process. 
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The general need for organizational boundary demarcation between conflictual identity 
elements is evident in the research of Elsbach and Sutton (1992) in which they investigate the 
legitimacy of two social movement organizations. They demonstrated that the decoupling of 
illegitimate actions from legitimate structures enabled organizations to shift attention away from 
controversies and towards socially desirable goals; claims of normative practices protected 
organizational legitimacy from illegitimate acts performed by activists. Similarly, in Elsbach's 
study (1994) of controversies in the California cattle industry, organizational signals of 
normative appropriateness secured legitimacy more effectively than those signaling efficiency. 
These empirical results offer support to Meyer and Rowan’s proposal (1977) that legitimacy 
follows from organizations’ adopting socially sanctioned visible practices while decoupling these 
from less acceptable activities. Further, Scott (1987) notes that, by using socially accepted 
procedures to carry out controversial activities, organizations can maintain the veneer of 
legitimacy. Taken together, researchers in this line of inquiry offer ample testimony to the 
criticality of boundary management in hybrid organizations. Boundaries are important markers 
partitioning the legitimate from illegitimate in order to maintain normative appropriateness. By 
implication, then, a boundary rupture that allows one element to bleed into the other, would 
create a crisis of identity, particular for an organization whose central identity claim is one of 
moral or cultural authority.  
This is the issue we seek to investigate. In particular, we study how legitimacy is affected 
by identity boundaries that shift under the weight of a scandalized image. Our primary research 
questions are as follows: How are identity boundaries in an ideographic organization maintained 
and contested when an image is scandalized? How are such boundaries reconstructed and re-
established to repair a tarnished identity—are they constructed to be consistent with one logic 
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(ideology and tradition?) or another (economic effectiveness)? Are the hybrid elements 
maintained as distinct and separable? The IOC provides an ideal site for examining the dynamics 
of identity compartmentalization and change, as it encompasses visible and segregated elements 
of a dualistic identity and each element’s different institutional logics: normative ideology and 
economic utilitarianism. We examine these next, through an analysis of IOC archival materials, 
public statements, and media accounts. 
THE DEMARCATED IDENTITY OF THE IOC 
The IOC Normative Identity: “Citius, Altius, Fortius.” 
The ideology of the IOC is perhaps nowhere as evident as in the organization’s own 
statement about its role and authority, which is published in “The Olympic Movement,” which is 
reprinted in Appendix A. Its ideological claims are lofty. For instance, the IOC acts “in the 
endeavor to place sport at the service of humanity” and towards “ensuring that in sports the spirit 
of fair play prevails and violence is banned.” Furthermore, the IOC officially “opposes any 
political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes.” According to the Olympic Charter, “The 
Olympic motto of the Olympic Movement ‘Citius, Altius, Fortius’ expresses the message which 
the IOC addresses to all who belong to the Olympic Movement, inviting them to excel in 
accordance with the Olympic spirit.” Roughly translated from the Latin, the universally accepted 
meaning is “Swifter, Higher, Stronger,” setting superior aspirations for athleticism and 
Olympism. The pairing of sport with ideology is a recurrent theme in much of the official IOC 
verbiage. As articulated in the Olympic Charter (Fundamental Principle #3), “The goal of 
Olympism is to place everywhere sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, 
with a view to encouraging the establishment of a peaceful society concerned with the 
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preservation of human dignity.” Fundamental Principle #4 explicitly entrusts this goal to the 
IOC.    
The purpose of these official statements is to protect (or buffer) the core ideology from 
any potential threat of corruption. This is accomplished through language and symbolic action. 
In the words of the “father of modern Olympism,” Baron Pierre de Coubertin, “The important 
thing in the Olympic Games is not winning but taking part. Just as in life, the aim is not to 
conquer but to struggle well.” More recently, the sixth President of the IOC (1972-80), Lord 
Killanin similarly claimed the universality of the IOC identity: “The Olympic Movement is not 
only the allocation and ruling of the Olympic Games. It is something throughout the world, 
which exists for 24 hours a day for every day of the year. It is something that can be good to all!” 
(The Olympic Movement: 27). The expressive, even aesthetic appeal of the normative ideology 
is clear in another quote attributed to de Coubertin: 
Sport must be envisaged as a generator of art and an opportunity for art.  It generates 
beauty because it creates the athlete who is a living sculpture.  It is an opportunity for 
beauty because of the buildings created for it and the spectacles and festivals to which it 
gives rise. (The Olympic Movement: 95). 
The identity of the IOC, particularly as reflected in its role and mission seemed to 
resonate with “broadly accepted norms, values, and belief systems that constitute the master 
principles of society, such as truth, equality and justice” (Haveman & Rao, 1997: 1613-1614). 
This ideological identity claim is seemingly consistent with, and predicated upon, general or 
master rules of society (Swidler, 1986), i.e., serving humanity, fostering peace and brotherhood, 
ensuring fair and equitable play on the field, and promoting equality and environmentalism. 
The congruence of the IOC identity with societal culture is articulated openly in this 
quote from IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch:  “Since its very earliest history, Olympism 
has been linked to culture, both ancient Olympism, a reflection of the Greek civilization, and 
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modern Olympism, which has taken on global dimensions. We will agree that the exact 
definition of Olympism is the marriage of sport and culture.” (The Olympic Movement: 91). 
Thus, the normative ideology, with its basis in tradition (Albert & Whetten, 1985), is readily 
apparent.  The institutional logic underlying the ideological element of the IOC identity is 
humanism and civilization; its legitimacy—or audience endorsement and support—is derived 
from its claim of alignment with broad societal principles.    
The IOC Utilitarian Identity: Ideology for Sale.   
The Olympic Charter contains a small, two-point section on “IOC Resources” which 
states the following: 
1.  The IOC may accept gifts and bequests and seek all other resources enabling it to 
fulfill its tasks. It collects revenues from the exploitation of rights, including television 
rights, as well as from the celebration of the Olympic Games.  
2.  The IOC may grant part of the revenues derived from the exploitation of television 
rights to the IFs [The International Federations], NOCs [National Olympic Committees] 
including Olympic Solidarity and the OCOGs [the local/city Organizing Committee for 
the Olympic Games]. 
In a 112-page manuscript on “The Olympic Movement,” a scant six pages (pp. 34-39), or 
5%, are devoted to the topic of “Resources and Marketing.” Ideology is used to frame and justify 
the commercial aspects of the Games: “Take away sponsorship and commercialism from sport 
today and what is left? A large, sophisticated, finely-tuned engine developed over a period of 
100 years -- with no fuel” (Richard W. Pound, Q.C. (IOC member), Olympic Movement: 37). 
The need for marketing and commercialism is claimed generically in the name of “sport” (and 
not the Olympics specifically), thus invoking “industry” (sports) norms to legitimate IOC 
commercial activity. And, while ideology may justify the consumerism attending the Olympics, 
identity partitioning is also evident. The Olympic Movement tome points out: 
The Olympic Games remain unique among major sporting events, as no advertising is 
allowed in the sporting stadia and no sponsor advertising appears on the participants. The 
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IOC policy of offering structured and exclusive global marketing programmes fosters the 
marketing partnerships and helps guard against excessive commercialization (The 
Olympic Movement: 37). 
And, in another publication, the issue of “excessive commercialization” is tackled head-
on. In the IOC publication, the question is asked—"Why do the Olympic Movement and the 
Olympic Games need sponsors?"—and answered as follows: 
Sponsor involvement with the Olympic Movement and the Olympic Games is not just 
monetary.  Because of the complexity of staging the world's largest sporting event, 
corporations' product, personnel and service support is as important as their financial 
support.  The Olympic Games could not be staged without the non-financial support that 
sponsors provide (Supporting the dream: Financing the Olympic Movement). 
A second question—“Are the Olympic Games too commercial?”—is addressed, like 
many business issues, by offering factual evidence and appeals to rationality. The IOC invites the 
reader to consider several “facts…before forming an opinion on the issue.” These include the 
fact that “During all coverage of the Olympic Games, the IOC does not allow broadcasters to 
show any advertising over the sporting images; the overall number of Olympic sponsors has been 
significantly reduced. For example, at the 1984 Sarajevo Olympic Winter Games there were 447 
international and domestic sponsors. The 1998 Nagano Olympic Winter Games have 37 
Worldwide and domestic sponsors,” and that “[d]ue to increasing pressure on their spending, 
governments are unable to adopt the supporting role that corporations can play. Therefore, the 
Olympic Movement has to generate revenue through commercial means, or the Olympic Games 
could perish.” In contrast, then, to the ideological identity, with its appeals to human emotions, 
aspirations, unlimited potential, and optimistic visions of desired future states, the utilitarian 
identity speaks to realism as well as the consequences of organizational actions.   
Perhaps the partitioning is nowhere as evident as in the separation of publications by the 
IOC: one set articulates the principles of Olympism, while the other stipulates the guidelines for 
commercialization of Olympic symbols. The former consist of documents entitled The Olympic 
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Movement and The Olympic Charter; the latter are entitled “Olympic Mark Guidelines,” 
“Approval Guidelines,” “Ambush Marketing Guidelines,” and the IOC “Olympic Marks and 
Imagery Usage Handbook,” which is coordinated with Meridian Management, its exclusive 
marketing and servicing operation for The Olympic Partners (TOP) programme. In these, the 
IOC often parades research results that attest to the potency of both the Olympic Games and its 
symbols, which are “intellectual properties”, owned exclusively by the IOC.   
In the “Handbook,” TOP corporate sponsors are reminded to “keep in mind the results of 
extensive research on people's perceptions of the Games” (p. 8). The handbook goes on to report 
that results from “research conducted for the IOC in July/August 1996 (in nine countries)” shows 
that “the Olympic Games are seen to hold an unrivaled position as the world's top sporting event 
by over 90% of the sample.” Moreover, much of the verbiage is directed at management 
(perhaps even micro-management) of the key ideological symbols, even including lists of “Do's 
and Don'ts” (Approval Guidelines, Section 7). For instance, the most recognized Olympic 
image—that of the five interlocked rings—had strict guidelines for its use, including these 
positioning rules when paired with a corporate logo to create a composite logo: 
A composite logo design can position the Sponsor's logo/name and official designation 
above, below, or next to the Olympic rings in any one of several configurations. 
However, whichever configuration is used, the minimum distance between the Sponsor's 
logo/name and the Olympic symbol must always be half the radius of an Olympic ring 
(when comparably sized to Sponsor logo) (Olympic Mark Guidelines, Edition 05.93, 
Section 2.5). 
The language here, as in the more ideologically oriented publications, attests to 
uniqueness and excellence in achievement, but the referent playing field is neither track nor field 
but the competitive marketplace. The logic here is one of managerialism and business strategy. 
As the governing body of Olympic sports, the IOC has been likened to one of “the world’s last 
great dictatorships,” an image stark in its contrast to the egalitarianism of Olympism: 
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Traditionally, organisations such as the International Olympic Committee … have 
exercised almost absolute power over their sports, at both the professional and amateur 
level; nationally and internationally.  They influence the lives of millions of people 
worldwide, and control events worth billions of dollars. They are often run by powerful 
individuals – Juan Antonio Samaranch at the IOC. ... [who] rule[s] with an autocratic, 
sometimes unforgiving, hand.  They have their own rules and systems of regulations, 
built up apart from the laws of the wider world (Financial Times, 11/6/98: 17). 
With the logic of managerialism and its focus on the “bottom line,” the IOC, according to 
one observer, pushes for hometown victories not for the Olympic glory but for the promise of 
greater revenues: 
As for the Olympics, stellar performances by the home team create higher enthusiasm 
locally. That leads to better television ratings and thus loftier profits for Samaranch and 
his buddies. Nothing helps this scenario more than when Americans flaunt their stars and 
stripes during an Olympics on their home turf by grabbing medal after medal (Moore, 
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 6/16/98: 2).  
As this reporter notes, the ideology of de Coubertin, which stresses participation over 
winning (as noted above), has been supplanted by the extortion to “Just win, baby” (Moore, The 
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 6/16/98: 2). Along with increasing revenues, there has been a 
corresponding growth in size to the point of “gigantism” (The New York Times, 9/10/2000). In 
growing the Olympics to better represent the international community, producing the Games 
comes to resemble “big business.” Because of size constraints, the number of cities able to host 
the Games becomes limited, and significantly more financial and material resources are required 
to support the Games. 
Bounding the hybridized identity 
The boundary markers partitioning the normative identity of the IOC from the utilitarian, 
economic identity are both symbolic and real. They are evident in the separation of publications, 
segmented by audiences, such that each IOC identity element aligns with a different but highly 
institutionalized logic concerning the values, beliefs, and rules of the (Olympics) Game(s). 
Symbolically, the ideological identity of the IOC emphasized its cultural alignment with societal 
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norms of the highest ideals, e.g., peace, justice, beauty, and human achievement. These were 
advanced in the Olympic symbols, presented as images consonant with this identity. The 
utilitarian identity of the IOC, in its presentation style and content, took on the features of the 
business culture with which it aligned, reporting marketing research, operational facts, and 
outcome scenarios. The symbols were the same, e.g. the Olympic rings, motto, flame, etc., but a 
utilitarian identity focused on their rigorous management to optimal competitive advantage in 
contrast to the ideological focus on expressiveness or emotion. 
And, while there were instances where one identity bled into the other (Why is there a 
need for sponsorship? Are the Olympic Games too commercial?), these were answered briefly, 
succinctly, and in the language of the identity sphere in which they were raised. By and large, the 
IOC seemed to have been successful in partitioning and legitimizing its dual, and potentially 
conflicting identity elements up until November, 1998. 
The 1999 Allegations of Bribery  
In late 1998, documents surfaced that seemed to indicate the Salt Lake City bid 
committee paid university tuition for the daughter of an IOC member. Allegations and reports of 
other IOC members receiving cash and in-kind benefits from the Salt Lake committee as well as 
other bid committees soon followed. Benefits provided by the Salt Lake bid committee 
specifically to IOC members and their relatives were to have included items ranging from health 
insurance and employment opportunities to sexual favors and accommodations for leisure 
activities.  Of particular significance, here, is that for what seems to have been the first time in 
recorded history, one of the IOC’s own, Swiss member Marc Hodler, legitimized the allegations. 
Hodler held a press conference at the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne about the time of the first 
bribery reports. In that conference, Hodler suggested that the IOC was to blame. At the time, this 
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octogenarian was both a long standing IOC member and head of the IOC Coordination 
Commission for the 2002 Salt Lake Games.  Coordination Commissions are typically charged 
with working with local organizers to ensure the successful production of the Games. Thus, 
Hodler’s role positioned him on the boundary between the ideology and the commercialism of 
the IOC. Because of this, we interpret Hodler’s actions as consistent with the boundary rupture. 
The scandal spotlighted the challenges of managing a hybridized identity. The normative identity 
of the IOC as an institution was challenged. Evidence suggested that the criteria for selecting the 
Olympic Games’ site were not based on the merits of the location or the organizational 
effectiveness of the proposed local Olympic committee, but rather on a city’s skill at influence 
peddling to bribe the votes of IOC members. 
As allegations and evidence continued to surface into 1999, federal, state, and local 
authorities within the United States launched investigations. The IOC initiated its own internal 
investigation, which was accompanied by voluntary and involuntary resignations of IOC 
members. Simultaneously, local and state authorities associated with the bid committee and the 
Games resigned. Immediate casualties included the SLOC’s president and senior vice-president. 
Other effects were less direct. The Salt Lake City mayor announced she would not seek re-
election, effectively forfeiting her opportunity to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. Top 
Olympic sponsors sat on sponsorship renegotiations. Attempts at wooing new sponsors for either 
the Salt Lake or subsequent Games stalled. Caustic critics took front stage, including the CEO of 
long time sponsor John Hancock, David D’Alessandro, who penned a scathing opinion-editorial 
in The New York Times calling for reforms including the resignation of IOC President 
Samaranch.   
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The third and fourth quarters of 1999 brought organizers for the 2000 Sydney Summer 
Games to their knees over budget and sponsorship shortfalls, threats from Congress to revoke the 
IOC’s nonprofit status in the United States, and revelations of the more pervasive use of Salt 
Lake type bidding practices by earlier bid committees seeking to host the Games. By the close of 
1999 and into 2000, juries handed down indictments on charges of conspiracy to commit bribery, 
fraud, and racketeering to a variety of actors affiliated with the Salt Lake scandal. Meanwhile, 
throughout mid to late 1999, the IOC undertook efforts to reform itself and its host city selection 
procedures. While some critics decried the impact of the IOC’s reforms, suggesting efforts were 
too little too late, other expert observers, investigators, and sponsors seemed to tire of the 
scandal’s details, increasingly at ease with the IOC’s measures. In summarizing their take on the 
scandal, most relevant actors offered prescriptions for managing the scandal in the medium to 
long term.  The Chronology of the IOC bribery scandal, 1998-2000, is presented in Appendix B. 
Overall, we emphasize the distinctiveness of the 1999 bribery scandal. We reviewed all 
articles dealing with ‘Olympic scandals’ published in the New York Times, Salt Lake Tribune, 
and Wall Street Journal, from 1980 until the 1999 bribery incident. Those articles typically 
addressed athlete doping, judging issues associated with athletic competition, and political 
controversies. We found almost no concern, in terms of scandal, with utilitarian or commercial 
activities associated with the Olympics. Only two types of commercial incidents surfaced:  
controversies with ticket sales and organizing committees’ difficulties with sponsors. On both 
fronts, the controversies did not reach scandal proportions and involved only local Olympic 
organizers. Finally, we found no concern, in terms of scandal, with normative and utilitarian 
identities. A full bibliography of the articles is available from the authors upon request. 
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While the Salt Lake incident was not the first time the Olympics had been tarnished by 
scandal or bad press, the incident was unique in that it focused on the normative and utilitarian 
elements of the organization behind the Olympics, the IOC. Indeed, scandals had marked the 
Olympics themselves since inception. In the 21st century alone, the 1936 Berlin Games elicited 
reactions to the Nazi role in hosting the Games; the 1968 Mexico City Games garnered questions 
about minorities’ use of those Games as a political platform; and both the 1980 Moscow Games 
and the 1984 Los Angeles Games bore witness to the impact of the Cold War and the boycotts.  
Moreover, for numerous Games, there were challenges concerning the participation of 
professional athletes (versus amateurs) and doping, or athletes’ use of performance-enhancing 
drugs. 
What unifies previous scandals is their affront upon the Olympics’ normative identity. 
That is, they all raised questions of normative appropriateness, i.e., the degree to which the 
Olympics, or the Olympic Movement more generally, was aligned with the tenets of its 
normative identity of encouraging the global promotion of peace through the fair practice of 
sport.  In comparison, what marked the 1999 bribery scandal was that the normative and the 
utilitarian identities both became suspect and that the IOC as an organization, not the Olympics 
more generally, was partly to blame for the scandal.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data Collection 
To investigate our two fundamental research questions—How are identity boundaries in 
an ideographic organization maintained and contested when an image is scandalized? How are 
such boundaries reconstructed and re-established to repair a tarnished identity?—we used a 
qualitative methodology, which has been shown to be effective in investigating sensitive matters 
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such as threats to organizational identity and legitimacy (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Glynn, 2000). 
The primary data sources were press accounts of the IOC scandal appearing in national and local 
newspapers.   
We analyzed 77 articles from three media sources: The Wall Street Journal, for its 
coverage of business and organizational issues, The New York Times, for its more general and 
international coverage, and The Salt Lake City Tribune, for its local coverage because of 
implications of the city’s role in the scandal. We selected domestic U.S. newspapers because the 
scandal occurred in the United States and because bribery scandals are typically of less concern 
outside of the Western, developed world. We later validated our findings through a comparison 
with international newspapers’ coverage of the scandal, which we discuss later. From electronic 
media searches, we located the 100 most relevant stories from each newspaper and carefully 
reviewed them for unique and in-depth content. We eliminated redundancies and superficial 
coverage; this resulted in a set of about 25 articles from each newspaper for the period from late 
November 1998 (when news first broke) through September 2000. The distribution of articles 
over time and by newspaper source is reported in Figure 1. 
----------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
----------------------- 
Initially, there is a flurry of articles through June 1999, which tapers off until late 
summer/early fall 2000, a blip coinciding with early press on the Sydney Games. The 77 articles 
averaged 1,117 words in length; as indexed by length, The New York Times provided the more 
extensive coverage (mean = 1,405 words) while The Wall Street Journal and The Salt Lake City 
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Tribune articles were more abbreviated (means = 1,174 and 900, respectively). A full 
bibliography of the 77 articles is available from the authors upon request. 
Data Analyses 
Organizational researchers have relied on content analyses to understand many 
phenomena, including how organizations present structural innovation or change (Arndt & 
Bigelow, 2000), how corporate annual reports mask negative organizational outcomes 
(Abrahamson & Park, 1994); how organizations cluster around different value structures 
(Kabanoff, Waldersee, & Cohen, 1995); and how senior managers communicate and manage 
crises (D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990). Similarly, journalism and mass communication research 
suggests that quantitative and qualitative content analyses of mass media are reliable and valid 
(Riffe & Freitag, 1997; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998). 
Our first step was to generate an appropriate coding scheme to use for content analysis. 
Iterating between data and theory, we generated key concepts and operationalized them in a 
coding scheme used by two independent and trained raters to analyze the 77 newspaper articles. 
We began generating working codes by drawing key concepts from the literature on 
organizational identity, identity threats, crises, and legitimacy (e.g., Albert & Whetten, 1985; 
Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Next, we examined the data for ideas, names, or labels, 
and concepts that emerged repeatedly or prominently in the articles. These were compared to our 
theoretically derived codes. We continually modified our coding scheme until we felt we had 
captured key concepts that were both theoretically and phenomenologically relevant and 
definitive. 
To illustrate: we used the label “Olympic ideals” to code passages referencing the beliefs, 
values, norms, or principles of the IOC and the Olympic Games; the label “Olympic symbolism” 
coded references to the Olympic torch, flame, rings, medals, etc.; and the label “Reforms” coded 
specific measures for addressing and handling the scandal. Conversely, we used the label 
“operations” to code passages capturing the production of the Olympics. We employed other 
codes, such as “budget issues” and “changes in sponsorship,” to further operationalize the 
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utilitarian identity. Examples of passages reflecting the business side, or production and 
management, of the Olympics follow:   
"But no determinations have been made about which categories [of sponsorship] will be 
controlled by the IOC and which will be national level.  Until those decisions are made 
and companies are signed up, SLOC will have a hard time knowing how much revenue it 
can count on.  The budget currently calls for $122 million from information-technology 
companies"  (Salt Lake Tribune, 5/14/99). 
"Fortunately, for Joklik's successor, most of the sports facilities are completed or are well 
under construction.  Major projects remaining include enclosing the Olympic 
speedskating oval and constructing the 120-kilometer hill for ski jumping.  All sports 
facilities are expected to be completed by November 2000 so they can be tested in 
competition long before the Games open on Feb. 8, 2002"  (New York Times, 1/9/99). 
Table 1 details our codes organized by larger topics or themes along with the total count 
of the times they appeared and their percentages by newspaper.  
----------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------------- 
With a coding scheme finalized, we trained independent raters to read the articles and 
apply these codes. Two raters read each article. In general, there was substantial agreement 
between the coders; any discrepancies were resolved through meetings and discussion. The final 
process culminated in a listing of codes and an establishment of agreed-upon criteria for applying 
the codes. 
Next, we imported the hand-coded articles into a qualitative data analysis software 
package, NVIVO, and electronically coded specific passages from the articles. We found 
NVIVO particularly useful for two reasons. First, NVIVO allowed us to electronically mimic our 
hardcopy-coding scheme, permitting us to apply more than one code to the same passage. Thus, 
if raters found that passages contained multiple meanings, we could code and retrieve these 
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passages with different codes and thus capture the richness of the text. Second, NVIVO allowed 
us to do both quantitative and qualitative content analyses, including counts of codes as well as 
more nuanced analyses with Boolean searches and detailed references back to coded passages’ 
original context. 
As an initial check on the appropriateness of the selected press accounts and our coding 
schemes, we examined the frequency of use of codes. We found that the IOC was indeed the 
focus of the scandal: References to the IOC organization with regard to the scandal accounted for 
over 16% of all coded passages (442/2,707). Moreover, the IOC identity was the focal point of 
reference:  References exclusive to the ideological identity (e.g., Olympic symbolism; Olympic 
Movement; Olympic ideals) were found in 212 passages (8%), while references exclusive to the 
utilitarian or business identity (e.g., budget issues; corporate sponsorship; 
management/operations of the Games) were found in 381 passages (14%). Interestingly, 
however, far more instances referenced perceptions of a hybrid ideological-utilitarian identity; 
mentions of the conjoined identity were found in 879 passages (32%). Taken together, these 
three sets of codes referencing the individual elements in isolation (22%) or in conjunction with 
each other (32%) accounted for more than half (54%) of the entire set of coded passages in the 
77 articles (1,472/2,707). Thus, we concluded that identity dynamics were an important aspect of 
media portrayals of the scandal.    
Our analyses unfold as follows. First, we present a media analysis of the IOC identity 
pre-scandal, circa 1999. Next, we report our analyses of media perceptions of the identity 
elements of the IOC during and directly after the scandal. We then move onto reporting on the 
IOC’s handling of the scandal and the post-scandal calls for reform and identity repair. We close 
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with a brief review of the media’s treatment of the IOC during the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter 
Games.   
ANALYSES 
Media Portrayals of the IOC Identity, pre-scandal:  June-November 1998 
We began by establishing the media portrayal of the IOC identity in the six months prior 
to the scandal, June through November 1998. We searched for articles mentioning the IOC in our 
three focal newspapers. This yielded 88 articles, distributed as follows: The Wall Street Journal 
(4), The New York Times (13), and the Salt Lake Tribune (71).   
Pre-scandal media attention focused on funding, budget, and staffing issues for the 
Sydney and Salt Lake Games, minor changes in Olympic sponsorships, various cities’ efforts to 
win the right to host the Games, and athletes’ use of performance enhancing drugs and 
international sports federations’ responses to the issue. While we are still coding and analyzing 
this data set [which we consider to be a baseline or control] we generally found the media’s pre-
scandal treatment of the IOC represented both its business and ideological identity elements. For 
example, articles regarding budget issues and bid city selection procedures evoked an image of 
the Olympics as a business operated by the IOC and its national and local counterparts. Such 
articles detailed the operational and managerial challenges associated with implementing the 
Games. By contrast, articles on doping in sports presented the IOC as a likely arbitrator in 
mediating drug related controversies, suggesting that the IOC might act to determine the registry 
of prohibited substances or preside over athletes’ alleged drug abuses.  In this later group of 
articles, the implication was that by virtue of its integrity and idealism, the IOC was best suited 
to develop, implement, and regulate a global anti-doping policy. The media’s presentation of the 
IOC in these articles emphasized its ideological elements. Overall, we observed a separation by 
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articles in their focus, with some emphasizing ideological or utilitarian elements, but not both. 
This changed, however, in November 1998.   
Boundary Alteration And Refracted Identity: Media Portrayals Of The IOC Scandal 
Our analysis of the 77 articles covering the IOC scandal revealed a partition between 
perceptions and endorsement of the identity elements of the IOC organization that had not been 
evident in the previous months prior. Table 2 presents illustrative excerpts from the newspaper 
accounts that speak to these dynamics.   
----------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
----------------------- 
Media portrayals of the ideological identity in the context of the scandal tended to be 
consistent with claims by the IOC itself. For instance, in the 381 accounts that addressed the IOC 
ideological identity, we found recurrent themes consonant with the master rules of society 
(Swidler, 1995), articulating values of peace, justice, and integrity, and extolling the virtues of 
human achievement. And, when the IOC seemed to lose sight of these during the scandal 
publicity, a journalist admonished the organization to “worry about losing the magic of the 
Olympics” (The New York Times, 1/24/99). Thus, there was the invocation of the institutional 
logic that was so aligned with this identity. 
Similarly, passages referencing the utilitarian or business identity of the IOC with regard 
to the scandal were also singularly focused on this element and its attending logic. For instance, 
the same journalist who reminded the IOC about need for magic (above) was equally clear in 
communicating the effectiveness of their business acumen: “In the past, the winner was the city 
willing to lose the most money … Now the Games are seen as having a beneficial economic 
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impact” (The New York Times, 1/24/99). Again, across the 212 passages that exclusively 
reference the IOC business identity, there was evidence of alignment with the logic of 
managerialism, and concerns for revenue, costs, profitability, corporate sponsorship and 
economic impact.    
However, the 879 passages that referenced the conjoined, hybridized identity presented 
by the scandal, struck an entirely different note. In these, journalists had a cynical tone, 
seemingly perturbed and confused over the uncertainty of the image that a dualistic IOC 
presented. One author expressed his disgust:  “[The Olympics] have no meaning. It’s a false 
dream.  They build the illusion of brotherhood, but it’s just a commercial venture. It’s a bunch of 
old people misusing old-fashioned dreams for their own purposes” (The New York Times, 
9/10/00). The jarring juxtaposition of contradictory identities—Olympic glory counterposed 
against unseemly unethical behavior—seemed to frustrate, confuse and even anger.  
All of us depend on a public that believes the Olympic Games are higher, purer and more 
noble than any other sporting event in the world. Though it doesn't happen very often, the 
interests of the poorest athlete and the richest corporation are exactly the same here: we 
all want the Olympic Games to stand for an integrity that can't be bought. They have no 
value to any of us if they don't”  (NYT, 5/17/00). 
The lack of boundaries created a blur of meaning and problematized making sense of the 
IOC; the conflict between identity elements in the IOC identity, latent and partitioned for so 
long, was now transparent. A de-compartmentalized hybrid identity produced antithetical images 
and a contestation in logics; audiences were hard pressed to understand or endorse the hybridized 
IOC or its constitutive identity elements. One journalist summed it up:      
The success of instituting a speedy cleanup…would be based on the assumption that the 
current scandal is an aberration; that it was caused by the unfortunate confluence of a 
new breed of overreaching local booster with I.O.C. members who do not fully 
understand the ideals of "Olympism," a 19th-century "movement" that combined the fair 
play of sports with the passion of religion.  
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There is evidence, though, that the problem is deeper, older and more profound than what 
has been presented as a shabby case of some Sydney and Salt Lake City payoffs for 
I.O.C. votes. The evidence paints a picture of an Olympic culture of moral relativism, if 
not systemic corruption, that has enabled the sporting spectacular to survive and prosper. 
(New York Times, 2/21/99) 
And another writer invoked the metaphor of governments to sort out this confusion of 
logics:  
It seems to be the way the world works: every government that forgets about the people 
who give it power and, instead, concentrates on keeping its secrets, keeping its perks, 
maintaining its rituals and preserving its own hide, eventually implodes. It happened to 
Louis XVI, and it happened to the Soviet Communist Party. Now, it's happening to the 
International Olympic Committee. Day by day, the I.O.C. proves itself to be more and 
more incapable of rising above the corruption scandal surrounding it and further and 
further from the honesty and openness that the Olympic Games represent” (New York 
Times, 5/17/00). 
Thus, it seemed that the boundary collapse in partitioning the IOC identity elements 
created a crisis of sensemaking that attenuated the legitimacy, credibility, and integrity of the 
organization as a whole. 
Identity Repair in the Aftermath Of The Scandal:  Legitimating a de-legitimated Identity 
In the aftermath of the bribery scandal, IOC insiders and outsiders offered reforms for 
handling the scandal and re-establishing the Olympics’ credibility. We coded and analyzed all 
the passages referencing IOC reform; summary excerpts are illustrated in Table 3. In doing so, 
we noted that the proposed reforms revolved around one of the two distinct identity 
dimensions—ideology or business. There was not a single proponent in the media advocating a 
reform that constructed a hybrid identity for the IOC. That is, observers invoked one of the IOC 
identity dimensions in their more general discussions of reforms. We found that observers relied 
upon the identity dimensions to frame their prescriptions for how the organization should 
manage the scandal. 
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----------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
----------------------- 
Ideological prescriptions. Pleas to return fully to the Olympic ideals and reinstate the 
IOC’s normative identity came from IOC insiders, members of the Olympic Family at the 
national (e.g. USOC) and local levels (e.g. SLOC), as well as some sponsors. For example, 
former member of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) Charlie Battle 
chastised the IOC for having become too big and businesslike, urging them to aim for recovering 
the spirit of the Olympics in their efforts to handle the scandal. Similarly, former SLOC member 
Welch advocated that the Olympics must remain about athletics and “not dollars and cents” (Salt 
Lake Tribune, 4/18/99).  
Ironically, some of these approaches called for the sponsors themselves to “come in and 
save the Olympic ideal the IOC has tarnished” (The Wall Street Journal, 9/29/00). There was a 
separation of the IOC from Olympism; it seemed that the scandal and ensuing crisis of 
legitimacy created an impression that the IOC might lack the “supreme authority” to enact this 
philosophy. We found such examples consistent with the position taken early by TOP sponsor 
John Hancock, and articulated by CEO David D’Alessandro. D’Alessandro at one point removed 
the Olympic rings from his company’s stationary and authored a scathing opinion-editorial 
criticizing the IOC.  We believe Hancock and D’Alessandro’s messages to be implicit calls for a 
return to a more ideological IOC. We found such examples particularly interesting as some 
observers only associated sponsors and changes in sponsorship more generally with the business 
or utilitarian identity. 
Business or utilitarian prescriptions. Conversely, other observers suggested that the IOC 
focus on the efficient and effective implementation of the Games themselves in order to recover 
 27 
from the scandal. This camp included IOC insiders as well as national and local level Olympic 
Family members. For example, organizing officials in both Salt Lake and Sydney reported that 
the best way for the Olympics to overcome the bribery scandal was for both sites to put on “a 
well managed Games” (Salt Lake Tribune, 11/21/99). IOC insiders in some cases, particularly 
those associated with the organization’s marketing and finance departments, reiterated such 
claims, noting that the IOC was “an oil tanker” with “a long-term business strategy,” (The Wall 
Street Journal, 9/29/00). Here the implication is that the best path for handling the scandal was to 
manage the Games deftly. 
A Postscript: The IOC Identity during the Salt Lake City Games   
The 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake City provided a unique opportunity to examine how 
Olympic participants and observers had come to view the IOC after the bribery scandal. As 
before, we collected all of the articles published by our three focal newspapers referencing the 
IOC during the 17-day period of the Games, February 8-24, 2002. From all of the articles, we 
selected and carefully reviewed those that explicitly and substantively addressed the IOC. We 
also carefully monitored televised newscasts and radio broadcast of the Games. We found that 
the majority of the media attention to the IOC during the Games focused on its handling of the 
pairs figure skating judging controversy, its response to cases of athletes’ doping, and its 
production and management of the Games, headed by new IOC President Jacques Rogge.      
In terms of the pairs skating controversy involving the Russian and Canadian 
competitors, attention to the IOC centered on its rapid response under Rogge relative to 
perceptions of how the IOC would have handled the matter under former President Samaranch: 
“…the International Olympic Committee signaled a fresh willingness to intervene speedily in an 
attempt to restore credibility to a tarnished competition and salvage its own sullied reputation” 
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(New York Times, 2/16/02). Moreover, observers noted the IOC’s ethical management of the 
situation. Indeed, the New York Times highlighted “the new transparency of the International 
Olympic Committee” in reporting the figure skating fallout, suggesting that even more “real 
reform” should be on the way following IOC’s aggressive management of the brouhaha relative 
to the International Skating Union (New York Times, 2/18/02). We found the media coverage of 
the IOC during the Salt Lake Games on this point to favor the organization’s ideological identity.  
Indeed, in articles appearing right after the pairs skating but before the final resolution of the 
judging aberration, observers generally called on the IOC to decide the issue: “The International 
Olympic Committee should get to the root of it” (New York Times, 2/16/02). 
A focus on the IOC’s ideological identity was repeated in terms of observers’ 
commentary on the miscellaneous incidents of drug use or doping. A handful of drug test failures 
surfaced toward the end of the Games, prompting observers to review the IOC’s recent anti-
doping efforts and historic incidents of doping, particularly those involving athletes from the 
former Soviet bloc nations. Like the coverage of the IOC vis-à-vis the skating scandal, media 
attention to the IOC in covering the doping spotlighted the organization’s role as a monitoring 
agent to ensure the purity and fulfillment of Olympic athletic ideals.   
Finally, attention to the IOC often settled on its new leader. With regards to both the 
skating and doping controversies, the media identified Rogge repeatedly as a key explanatory 
variable in accounting for the more successful IOC responses to and management of scandals: 
Credit Jacques Rogge, the new president of the International Olympic Committee with 
intervening to prevent the pairs figure skating imbroglio from disfiguring the Winter 
Games in Salt Lake City.  He leaned hard on the International Skating Union to remedy 
the judging distortions that marred the pairs competition, and in so doing protected the 
integrity of the Games.  His openness and decisiveness are a welcome break from past 
Olympic traditions (New York Times, 2/16/02). 
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Indeed, Rogge himself reported, “I don’t think this has created damage to the Olympic 
movement, because it was resolved fast” (New York Times, 2/18/02). Jere Longman, the New 
York Times’ reporter largely responsible for that newspaper’s coverage, best articulated the 
media’s take on Rogge’s role and effect:  
… by acting quickly and forcefully, the IOC’s new president, Dr. Jacques Rogge, not 
only helped wipe out the state of the skating furor, but he also presented a public face of 
the IOC that appears more sensitive to public opinion and to issues that threaten the 
legitimacy of sporting competition (New York Times, 2/18/02). 
Our review of the media coverage of the IOC during the Salt Lake Games suggests that 
the IOC had somehow managed to salvage its sullied reputation and return to its conjoined 
organizational identity by 2002. Media coverage of the IOC during the 2002 Winter Games did 
not neglect the business side of the Olympics or the production and management of the Games. 
We found evidence of concern with operations and business. What we did not find however was 
a mixing or a juxtaposition of the ideological and the business identities in the media’s coverage 
of the IOC. Rather, mention of the functional or operational side of the Olympics was typically 
discrete and unrelated to mentions of the Olympic ideals, Movement, and symbolism. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 Our findings attest to the critical role of boundary management in identity construction 
in an ideographic organization Using media portrayals of the scandal, we document how the IOC 
partitioned embedded ideological and utilitarian elements to render the enterprise understandable 
and thus legitimate (Suchman, 1995). We found that media portrayals segmented the scandalized 
image of the IOC in ways consonant with those of the organization. Clarity and 
comprehensibility attended perceptions of singular identity elements—ideology or utility—
because they resonated with institutionalized logics that encoded sanctioned values, norms, 
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beliefs, and rules of engagement. The overall effect on the audience, we infer, is that IOC 
identity could be perceived more readily as monolithic rather than a complex, conflictual multi-
dimensional entity. With the boundary rupture precipitated by the scandal, this perception could 
no longer be sustained; the juxtaposition of conflicting images and confusion of logics elicited 
proposals for reforms that refocused the IOC on one identity element or the other, but not both 
together. 
The limitations of the study offer opportunities for future research. Obviously, this 
research investigates but one organization, which might be considered a theoretically strong case. 
The IOC is in the business of enacting an ideology, that of Olympism. As such, it is a case that 
renders the identity dynamics more transparent but may also limit the generalizability of 
findings. Clearly, future research directed at studying other ideographic organizations, as well as 
other types of organizational identities, is needed. Further, because we were attempting a 
synthesis of the identity and institutional perspectives on boundary demarcation within an 
organization, we took a coarse-grained approach to our analysis, investigating prominent codes 
and their occurrences. A more fine-grained approach, investigating variances in perceptions of 
identity as articulated by different types of sources (e.g., organizational spokespersons; 
journalists; public audiences; corporations) and by the content and/or style of their rhetoric, is 
warranted. For instance, findings in Table 2 suggest that juxtaposed images of conflicting 
identities elicited stronger and more emotional responses than did more clearly bounded images, 
i.e., ideological or utilitarian identities. Distilling the relationship between audience 
comprehensibility and endorsement and identity partitioning is a promising avenue for future 
work. 
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APPENDIX A: THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE 
The International Olympic Committee, created by the Paris Congress on 23rd June 1894, is the 
supreme authority of the Olympic Movement. It owns all rights concerning the Olympic symbol, 
the Olympic flag, the Olympic motto, the Olympic anthem and the Olympic games. 
Its role is to lead the promotion of Olympism in accordance with the Olympic Charter.  For that 
purpose, the International Olympic Committee: 
• Encourages the coordination, organization and development of sport and sports competitions, 
and ensures the promotion and application, in liaison with the international and national 
sports institutions, of measures aimed at strengthening the unity of the Olympic Movement; 
• Collaborates with the competent public or private organizations and authorities in the 
endeavor to place sport at the service of humanity; 
• Ensures the regular celebration of the Olympic Games; 
• Participates in actions to promote peace, acts to protect the rights of the members of the 
Olympic Movement and acts against any form of discrimination affecting the Olympic 
Movement; 
• Strongly encourages, by appropriate means, the promotion of women in sport at all levels and 
in all structures, particularly in the executive bodies of national and international sports 
organizations with a view to the strict application of the principle of equality of men and 
women. 
• Supports and encourages the promotion of sports ethics; 
• Dedicates its efforts to ensuring that in sports the spirit of fair play prevails and violence is 
banned;  
• Leads the fight against doping in sport; 
• Takes measures the goal of which is to prevent endangering the health of athletes; 
• Opposes any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes; 
• Encourages sports organizations and public authorities to use their best efforts to provide for 
the social and professional future of athletes; 
• Encourages the development of sport for all, which is part of the foundations of high-level 
sport, which in turn contributes to the development of sport for all;  
• Sees to it that the Olympic Games are held in conditions which demonstrate a responsible 
concern for environmental issues and encourages the Olympic Movement to demonstrate a 
responsible concern for environmental issues, takes measures to reflect such concern in its 
activities and educates all those connected with the Olympic Movement as to the importance 
of sustainable development;  
• Supports the International Olympic Academy (IOA); 
• Supports other institutions, which devote themselves to Olympic education.  
Source: The Olympic Movement, pp. 17, 19 and 21. 
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APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY OF THE IOC BRIBERY SCANDAL, 1998-2000 
Date Event 
11/24/98 Letter from SLOC files made public suggests that the Salt Lake bid committee paid 
American University tuition for the daughter of an IOC member from Cameroon. 
12/8/98 SLOC admits 6 relatives of IOC members are among 13 people to receive nearly 
$400,000 from the bid committee. 
12/9/98 IOC Member Marc Holder reports, “Salt Lake paid because they lost twice and wanted 
to win.  It helped get votes.” 
12/10/98 IOC President Samaranch orders an internal investigation to be headed up by Canadian 
IOC member Dick Pound. 
12/14/98 Utah Governor Mike Leavitt requests SLOC ethics panel investigation, which begins 
12/18/98. 
12/22/98 Former US Senator George Mitchell becomes head of USOC team to investigate 
selection process for American bid-city. 
12/23/98 Department of Justice and FBI launch investigations. 
1/99 Details surface regarding the potential payment by the SLOC for sexual favors for IOC 
members, the potential provision of jobs and health care by the SLOC for IOC 
members and their relatives, and the potential underreporting by the SLOC of public 
funds used to pursue the Games. 
1/8/99 Frank Joklik and Dave Johnson resign as SLOC president and senior vice-president. 
1/12/99 Salt Lake City Mayor Deedee Corradini announces she will not run for another term, 
meaning that she will not oversee that city’s 2002 Olympics. 
1/13/99 IOC refuses to sanction Salt Lake City. 
1/19/99 Beginning of a series of resignations by IOC members. 
1/20/99 Utah launches state investigation. 
1/22/99 Senior IOC official Dick Pound acknowledges disappointing conduct of select IOC 
members and the need for reform while praising Samaranch and advocating stability in 
speech before International Sports Summit in New York; Sydney Olympic Committee 
president admits he promised payments to IOC members hours before the vote for the 
host of the 2000 Games—a vote Sydney won. 
1/24/99 IOC executive board expels 6 members and proposes changes to the system of bidding 
on the Olympics as resignations and investigations continue; calls for Samaranch’s 
resignation denied. 
2/4/99 Utah Governor Leavitt begins plans to reorganize SLOC. 
2/9/99 SLOC ethics committee blames bid-committee leaders Welch and Johnson but finds no 
evidence of criminal misconduct.   
2/11/99 Mitt Romney becomes SLOC president; IOC holds meetings with its top 11 worldwide 
sponsors in Manhattan to assure them of its commitment to reform. 
2/14/99 David D’Alessandro, CEO of John Hancock, a long-time top Olympic sponsor, authors 
a scathing NYT editorial criticizing the IOC and calling for reform; John Hancock 
simultaneously removes the Olympic rings from its stationary and billboards and 
threatens to withdrawal its televised Olympic broadcasts if reform is not implemented. 
2/99 US Senators advocate reforms and threaten removal of IOC nonprofit status.  
3/1/99 Mitchell Commission releases report, blaming scandal on corrupt host city selection 
process. 
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Date Event 
3/11/99 Former SLOC vice president Johnson alleges that senior IOC members were aware of 
the bid committee’s payments in their efforts to secure the Games. 
3/99 Utah officials swap allegations of responsibility. 
3/17/99 IOC expels 6 members while bestowing Samaranch with a vote of confidence; 
[ultimately 10 IOC members either resign or are forced out] Eastman Kodak Co. 
announces an 8-year renewal of its Olympic sponsorship. 
3/19/99 Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) reports no new 
sponsors since the scandal.    
4/8/99 SLOC reports scandal-related legal bills through February at $1.5 million.  
4/9/99 IOC forms ethics commission to investigate. 
4/16/99 Senate questions American IOC members about slow pace of IOC reforms after 
Samaranch refuses to testify before its Commerce Committee. 
4/18/99 Johnson & Johnson pulls out of its $30 million sponsorship for the 2002 Winter 
Games. 
5/5/99 Legal attempts made to block opening of Atlanta bid records for 1996 Summer Games. 
6/17/99 IOC session opens to the public for the first time ever; members chastise Salt Lake; 
Turin, Italy triumphs over Sion, Switzerland to win the 2006 Winter Games. 
7/19/99 Atlanta Olympic Committee opens some bid records, leaving 8 boxes private. 
8/3/99 Salt Lake City businessman pleads guilty to fraudulently accounting for the salary he 
paid to a senior IOC member’s son. 
9/1/99 Federal grand juries in two states indict a senior IOC member on felony counts of lying 
to federal agents and entering the US illegally.   
9/11/99 Leaks from Atlanta’s 1996 bid documents suggest to House subcommittee that Atlanta 
employed efforts similar to Salt Lake’s tactics to win Games.   
10/14/99 Former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young confesses he spoke with Salt Lake City leaders 
about additional strategies, such as scholarships for IOC family members, for landing 
the Games. 
11/12/99 USOC transfers investigation of its own role in the bribery scandal to Senate 
committee; Visa International announces a 4 year renewal of its Olympic sponsorship. 
7/21/00 Federal grand jury indicts Salt Lake bid committee leaders Welch and Johnson on 
charges of conspiracy to commit bribery, fraud, and racketeering; Welch and Johnson 
become the fourth and fifth people prosecuted in the bribery scandal. 
9/3/00 CEO David D’Alessandro recommits John Hancock to the Olympics, lengthening the 
company’s sponsorship through 2004.  
9/16-10/1/00 2000 Summer Games, Sydney, Australia 
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Figure 1: Sample Articles by Newspaper & Date of Publication (N=77) 
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Table 1: Codes Used to Analyze Data 
 NYT SLT WSJ Total Count 
Business Identity     
Budget issues 17% 65% 18% 101 
Operations 26% 34% 39% 119 
Changes in sponsorship 24% 45% 31% 163 
Commercialization 26% 21% 53% 34 
Costs 16% 39% 45% 49 
Funding 31% 52% 17% 124 
     
Ideological Identity     
Olympic Ideals 54% 16% 30% 82 
Olympic Movement 40% 36% 24% 78 
Olympic Symbolism 29% 21% 50% 52 
Culture of the IOC 29% 28% 43% 82 
Value of sponsorship 33% 34% 32% 114 
     
Miscellaneous     
Advertising 28% 9% 63% 43 
Ambush marketing 60% 0% 40% 5 
Athletes 56% 21% 22% 103 
Brand/branding 25% 25% 50% 32 
Marketing 20% 36% 44% 64 
Negotiations 18% 39% 42% 109 
     
Organizations     
Congress 18% 56% 26% 34 
Department of Justice 18% 43% 39% 28 
IOC 37% 29% 34% 439 
SLOC 5% 84% 10% 129 
SOCOG 11% 79% 11% 19 
USOC 27% 41% 32% 110 
     
Sponsorship     
Coca-Cola 43% 19% 38% 21 
Corporate support 22% 65% 14% 51 
Corporations 16% 42% 42% 19 
John Hancock 49% 10% 41% 63 
Sponsors/sponsorship 30% 39% 31% 142 
UPS 55% 9% 36% 11 
US West 43% 29% 29% 7 
VISA  35% 30% 35% 20 
Xerox 20% 0% 80% 5 
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 NYT SLT WSJ Total Count 
The Scandal     
Accountability 70% 10% 20% 10 
Allegations 44% 20% 36% 59 
Bribery activities 45% 31% 24% 134 
Concern 36% 39% 25% 92 
Corruption 50% 21% 29% 147 
Credibility 33% 60% 7% 30 
Dismissal 62% 11% 27% 74 
Ethics 54% 14% 32% 50 
Exposure 47% 39% 14% 49 
Handling the scandal 44% 30% 25% 158 
Image 47% 38% 15% 53 
Impact 31% 40% 29% 112 
Investigation 32% 33% 35% 163 
Integrity 52% 24% 24% 21 
Involvement 26% 30% 43% 23 
Misunderstanding 8% 73% 19% 37 
Other damage 38% 25% 37% 73 
Perception 25% 33% 42% 12 
Publicity 14% 61% 25% 84 
Reforms 38% 27% 35% 313 
Resignation 57% 18% 25% 95 
Responsibility 41% 44% 15% 71 
Scandal details 44% 29% 27% 103 
Scrutiny 39% 39% 22% 23 
Secrecy 49% 24% 27% 45 
Suspicions 36% 48% 16% 25 
Tarnish 33% 28% 39% 57 
Threat 44% 38% 19% 32 
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Table 2. Illustrative Excerpts on Media Portrayals of the IOC Identity 
Ideological Identity (N=381) Contested Hybrid Identity (N=879) Business Identity (N=212) 
“For the $10 billion generated during each four-year 
Olympic cycle is attracted not by archers or runners or 
skiers or skaters, but by the Olympics' feel-good mythology 
of fairness, integrity and level playing fields. If that is 
debunked, the Games' sponsors worry, the 104-year-old 
modern-day Olympic movement will tumble from its perch 
on Mount Olympus into the common mire of other sports.” 
WSJ, 1/6/98 
"I see the Olympics as the last great demonstration of peace 
in the world," Romney said.” NYT, 9/9/99 
“He [Samaranch] has said that the Olympic movement is 
more important than the Catholic Church…” NYT, 2/5/99 
“They [critics] argue that Mr. Samaranch, who was a 
leading sports official in the Franco regime, became an IOC 
member in 1966 and then Spanish ambassador to the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War, is too wedded to the idea of the 
Olympics as an Old Club rather than a modern corporation.  
He fondly refers to all those who have anything to do with 
the Games as “the Olympic Family.”” WSJ, 1/20/99 
"The I.O.C. needs to worry about losing the magic of the 
Olympics," said Charlie Battle, who was in charge of 
international relations for the Atlanta Olympic organizing 
committee. "As they have become such big business and 
have become so obsessed with being big and having the 
best athletes, they have lost a little of the magic of bringing 
the whole world together in the interest of peace. They 
don't think people will pay big money for that. To me, that's 
all they've got."   NYT, 1/24/99 
 
“Looking out on the world from within the glass walls 
of Chateau de Vidy, on the serene Swiss shores of Lake 
Geneva in Lausanne, the members of the International 
Olympic Committee had come to believe that they had 
cornered the market on virtue. They are, after all, in the 
business of manufacturing heroes and retailing dreams.” 
WSJ, 1/6/99 
"The Olympics could end as far as I'm concerned," said 
Jos Hermens, a distance runner for the Netherlands at 
the 1972 Munich Games who is now a sports agent. 
"They have no meaning. It's a false dream. They build 
the illusion of brotherhood, but it's just a commercial 
venture. It's a bunch of old people misusing old-
fashioned dreams for their own purposes. It's like a cult. 
These people are addicted to power." NYT, 9/10/00 
“The Olympic motto -- "Swifter, Higher, Stronger" -- is 
now understood to be an auctioneer's chant in a corrupt 
bidding system that has allowed wealthy cities like 
Sydney, Australia, (and Nagano, Japan, and Salt Lake 
City) to grease delegates with lavish presents. I would 
call them bribes.”  NYT, 1/25/99 
“Having successfully turned the Olympics into a 
lucrative business marketed on the idea of sports as a 
kind of universal good, there is an urgency to limit the 
damage and recover the luster and earning power the 
Olympics have come to take for granted.” NYT, 2/20/99 
“Over time, the IOC also became an organization that, 
while generating billions of dollars in revenue to stage 
the Games, put itself beyond the meddling reach of 
outsiders.  It insists, for instance, that its members don’t 
represent their countries to the IOC, but rather represent 
the IOC to the world.  At the same time, paradoxically, 
it acts as a ward of the world.  It is incumbent on bid 
cities to fly members and a guest to their cities for 
inspection.”  WSJ, 1/20/99 
“The Olympics have over the last 20 years grown 
into a huge and quite profitable enterprise, and cities 
around the world have become aggressive in trying to 
win the rights to stage them.”  NYT, 2/5/99 
“The rings represented a valuable franchise, like the 
golden arches of McDonald’s.” SLT, 2/17/00 
“…But the Olympics in America and in Salt Lake 
operate off the back of corporate America.”  SLT, 
8/20/99 
“No matter what happens on the track, in the pool or 
on the field, there may be no more dramatic 
comeback in 2000 than the one the International 
Olympic Committee has made on the sponsorship 
front.” NYT, 9/3/00 
“The financial revival that saved the Olympics 15 
years ago has mutated into the big money excesses 
that threaten to cripple the Olympics today.”  NYT, 
1/24/99 
“In the past, the winner was the city willing to lose 
the most money,” Mr. Pound said.  “Now the Games 
are seen as having a beneficial economic impact.” 
NYT, 1/24/99 
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Table 3: Illustrative Excerpts on Media Portrayals of the Prescriptions for Reform/Handling the Scandal 
(Taken from ‘Reform’ Code, N=313) 
Ideological Hybrid Business 
“Samaranch told McCain "we share your concern about 
the need for reform of the International Olympic 
Committee {IOC} and want to assure you that we are 
deeply committed to restoring the integrity of the Olympic 
ideals." SLT, 3/31/99 
“Mr. Samaranch has sought to use the Sydney Games to 
exalt glorious athletic accomplishment as an antidote to 
the past two years of scandals that have tarnished his 
organization. "These are the athletes' Games," Mr. 
Samaranch has said over and over here. WSJ, 9/29/00 
“Our organization was hurt, but not the Olympic Games," 
Samaranch said.  NYT, 9/10/00 
“At Coca-Cola, the company has chosen to "move 
forward on all things Olympic," said Deutsch, despite the 
uncertainty generated by the scandal. "We're making a 
very specific distinction between the administration of the 
Games and the Games themselves," Deutsch added. "We'll 
do everything we can to support our sponsorship and to 
get the full value from it." NYT, 2/11/99 
"The I.O.C. needs to worry about losing the magic of the 
Olympics," said Charlie Battle, who was in charge of 
international relations for the Atlanta Olympic organizing 
committee. "As they have become such big business and 
have become so obsessed with being big and having the 
best athletes, they have lost a little of the magic of 
bringing the whole world together in the interest of peace. 
They don't think people will pay big money for that. To 
me, that's all they've got."   NYT, 1/24/99 
“The Olympics must be about the athletes and sport, not 
dollars and cents.”  Welch said. SLT, 4/18/99 
“Lisa Delpy-Neirotti, who studies the IOC's stewardship 
of the Games as a professor of sport management at 
George Washington University, says the sponsors keep 
thinking the scandal will go away. "It isn't going away," 
Ms. Delpy-Neirotti explains. "At some point, the sponsors 
will need to come in and save the Olympic ideal the IOC 
has tarnished."  WSJ, 9/29/00 
No references were found. 
 
“Sandy Holloway, the chief executive of the Sydney Olympic 
committee, said he was pleased with the I.O.C.'s decisions today 
and thought it would allow the Sydney committee "to get on with 
the job of organizing the 2000 Olympic Games, free from the 
distractions of the last month." NYT, 1/25/99 
“Leavitt's [Utah Governor] view is that "the only way to 
ultimately put it into perspective and completely redeem ourselves 
is by putting on a well- managed Games. . .This will be part of the 
history of the Salt Lake Games, but not what people will 
remember most." SLT, 11/21/99 
“Said Mark Schurman, Herman Miller's director of corporate 
communications: "We're confident past issues are being pursued 
by the appropriate authorities and that new management is focused 
on the execution of the 
Games." SLT, 8/20/99 
"The IOC is, of course, looking beyond," said Michael Payne, the 
IOC's director of marketing. "We've already signed marketing and 
broadcast agreements through 2008. My colleagues, back in 
Lausanne are already deeply involved in planning for the 2006 
Winter Games in Turin." SLT, 1/23/00 
“IOC management, bolstered by $500 million in sponsorship 
agreements over the next four years and a multibillion-dollar U.S. 
broadcast contract with NBC, remains apparently unperturbed by 
the calls for radical reform. "The IOC is an oil tanker," says IOC 
Marketing Director Michael Payne, arguing that a quick shift of 
course is not in order. "There is a long-term business strategy that 
is not changing. Everybody is bored with the scandal." WSJ, 
9/29/00 
 
